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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY-MAKING:
REFLECTIONS ON THE PROCESS OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
David R. Barnhizer*
INTRODUCTION
Every new technology carries its own adverse effects and
.these must receive attention equal to the technology itself.1
Into the quiet of turn-of-the-century America, with its dirt
roads, one-horsepower propulsion, and intricate system of rail
transport, clattered and banged the car. Four wheels joined to
the internal combustion engine, the automobile rapidly became the
most popular means of transportation ever devised. What
would have been the public response if, at that moment, it
were revealed that a conspiracy existed to cause the injury or
death of millions of persons,2 and that the same plotters intended
to foul our air, clog the streets of our cities, and create such a
din of noise as never before existed on this planet?'
* A.B., Muskingum College, 1966; J.D., Ohio State University, 1969;
LL.M., Harvard Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, Director of Clinical
Studies, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Member, Ohio and Colorado State
Bars.
1. Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U.
CINN. L. REV. 587, 590 n. 17 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Katz] citing Report
to the Secretary of the Interior of the Special Study Group on Noise and the
Sonic Boom in Relation to Man at 32, Nov. 4, 1'958 (unpublished).
2. In the ten year period 1960-69, motor vehicle accidents took 475,000
lives, and inflicted disabling injuries on seventeen million more persons. One
estimate places the total monetary cost of highway accidents during this- period
at $90 billion. Hearings on H.R. 16788 and Related Bills Before the Sub-
comm. on Roads of the House Committee on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., at 474 (1970) (Statement of Howard Pyle, President, the National Safety
Council).
3. Research is only now being performed on the effects of excessive noise
and congestion upon human health. Preliminary studies indicate potentially
severe effects on both physical and psychological well-being. See NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE. ADMINISTRATION, TRANSPORTATION NOISE POLLUTION,
CONTROL AND ABATEMENT 5-38 (1970); and NEWSWEEK, Vol. LXXIX, No. 6,
February 7, 1972, at 45 (citing report of E.P.A.). That urban traffic congestion
may have reached comic levels is observed by Lewis Mumford. He states:
Horsedrawn vehicles in New York, according to a traffic study made in
1907, moved at an average speed of 11.5 miles an hour: today automo-
biles crawl at the average daytime rate of some six miles an hour....
L. MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY 550 (1961).
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In 1955, concerned citizens of Santa Barbara, California,
fought vainly to prevent the installation of nearby offshore oil
rigs.' On January 27, 1969, Union Oil Company's platform A
blew out, creating an enormous oil slick endangering the coast-
line and natural beauty of the area.5
These seemingly unrelated activities, and such others as the
construction of a massive system of interstate highways, and the
exhaustion of fossil fuels, possess one common characteristic-
the decisions on the implementation of these technologies were
made without any full consideration of the total effects which
would result.I
Historically, our economic and political institutions have
functioned in the interest of an economic power elite. Plati-
tudes of a democratic ideal and citizen participation have flowed
endlessly from the official portrayers of our political system, dis-
guising the real nature of that process. The numerical majority
has had little impact on the decisions, economic and political,
which shape the nature and quality of its existence. This has
been a pattern with little change.
Technological and industrial growth has proceeded blindly,
without plan or purpose other than to "progress." The total sys-
temic effect of technologically related decisions has not been
considered. As the industrial and technological revolutions have
run their course, our decision-makers have continued to ignore
all but the narrowest questions of benefit and impact. This
process has been considered in the context of power plant
sitings:
[11n the ordinary course of business, the company will cal-
culate the estimated costs and benefits of the prospective in-
stallation without reference to any damage to the community
caused by smoke or other waste products. In the language
of economists, pollution of the community's air or streams
through the operation of the power plant would be a "social
cost," not a cost of the enterprise; it would be an "external"
not an "internal" cost.7
4. W. HCKEL, WHO OwNs AMERCA 99 (1971).
5. Id. at 90, 91.
6. The decisions have typically given weight only to the "first order" ef-
fects of proposals. These can be defined as the effects for which a particular
technology is designed and intended. "Secondary" and. "tertiary" effects are
side effects which are more or less predictable as a consequence of the imple-
mentation of a technology but which businesses have not been considering.
7. Katz, supra note 1 at 592. An excellent analysis of cost-benefit rela-
tionships and theory which examines the underlying conceptual framework of
social and economic costs can be found in G. CALABRiSi, THE COSTS OF Acci-
DENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970), reviewed Michelman, 80
YALE LJ. 647 (1971).
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Such "social" and "external" costs have been either ignored
or distributed to those citizens least able to resist the imposi-
tion.' We are, however, "moving into a period in which the margin
for error will be narrower and the costs of unwise choices higher
than in the past."9
These limitations on the nature of our technologically ori-
ented decisions are in large part a response to fundamental as-
sumptions contained in our legal system. 10 The legal and eco-
nomic systems have existed within a symbiotic relationship from
which each derives the ability to define itself through the inter-
action of theory and control. Issues of "business" costs of an
enterprise and "non-business" costs of technological proposals
exist simply because the "law" creates such a dichotomy. These
cost definitions arise, not from some command of natural law,
but because the power of economic self-interest and shared class
identities have dominated both courts and legislators. However,
in the same manner as legal definitions are created, they can be
redefined."
8. REPORT OF THE STUDY OF CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (SCEP),
MAN'S IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 232 (1970) (sponsored by the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) found that
[tihe social costs of pollution are borne by the sectors of society that
suffer from the deterioration of the environment, while economic bene-
fits are enjoyed by the source enterprise and the purchasers of its
product.
9. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF AS-
SESSMENT AND CHOICE (Report to the House Committee on Science and Astro-
nautics) at 12 (1969) [Hereinafter cited as ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE]. In rec-
ognizing past patterns of decision-making, the Academy also stated we can no
longer permit decisions regarding new and developing technologies to be made
solely on the basis of "immediate utility to their sponsors and users." Id. at 13.
Even though there are numerous spokesmen on each side of the question of
when, if, how, and why we will have overburdened our life support systems be-
yond a critical point, our past actions have clearly endangered those systems.
The Academy perhaps best summed up the situation in stating that, as a
consequence of past decision-making errors, "we may increasingly find our-
selves faced with consequences that are truly irreversible-for example, profound
climatic changes, or permanent alterations in ecological regimes, or irreversible
social deterioration." Id. at 13.
10. Whether or not the (current) assessors are aware of the fact, the existing
legal order infuses their calculations. It is the legal order which determines
which of the anticipated costs and benefits are taken into account by the enter-
prise and which are ignored. Katz, Decision-Making in the Production of
Power, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Vol. 224, No. 3, September 1971, at 192, 194
[hereinafter cited as Decision-Making].
11. Legal doctrines are now being created or rediscovered which are increas-
ingly being used to infuse industrial and bureaucratic decision-making with
legitimate competing points of view. Among the methods suggested are the use
and expansion of various theories of tort liability. See particularly Katz, supra
note 1, where it is proposed that traditional theories of liability based upon con-
siderations other than intention or negligence be expanded. The available theo-
ries would be: (1) liability for abnormally dangerous activities; (2) nuisance;
and (3) strict products liability. In the area of management of natural re-
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BARRIERS TO CHANGE
Business Interests
Any radical restructuring of policy-making in business must
take into account the need for cooperation from economic in-
terests suddenly finding much they considered sacred changed
drastically before them. No system of laws can be fully effec-
tive without at least a partial commitment by all affected. Al-
though environmental reform in the context of technological de-
cision-making can be achieved in part through judicial and leg-
islative reworkings of economic and legal premises, full and effec-
tive reform requires the cooperation of business and industry.
The judicial system is an immediate, individualized response
mechanism, and can serve as a solution on only one level of
the problem. Courts must address themselves typically to one
case, with one generally limited set of facts or issues and few
participants. Legislative reforms also depend on case-by-case
enforcement even when resistance is widespread. In both the ju-
dicial and legislative forums, efforts for reform must consider
the force of competitive pressures upon business decision-mak-
ing. If a significant number of enterprises in a particular in-
dustry (or alternative industries, where product or service sub-
stitution may be a reality at some point) do not participate vol-
untarily in efforts to consider social costs through redefinition
of cost structures, the socially conscious business risks severe
competitive harm. 2 No business can be expected to attempt re-
form on an individual basis when that reform may mean failure
of the company itself. Therefore, realistic efforts for change
must occur within the broadest legislative context of definition.
Only in this way can rational and comprehensive decisions be
made in private industry.
International Considerations
The pressures away from consideration by industries of
the social cost implications of technological proposals transcend
national boundaries. Economic pressures between nations, col-
lectively and individually, may force results inconsistent with
interests in environmental quality, regardless of any reforma-
tion in the nation's internal economic policies. The task of de-
sources Joseph Sax of the University of Michigan views these tort doctrines as
less useful than that of the public trust. This latter principle is offered as the
only method having "the breadth and substantive content . . . useful as a tool
of general application ...... J. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine In Natural
Resource Law. Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471, 474 (1970).
12. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 56.
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veloping supra-national solutions will not be an easy one. The
problems confronted by the major industrial powers must be
viewed as strikingly dissimilar from those of the developing coun-
tries. The more affluent countries can afford to talk about limi-
tations of production, about cut-backs on the utilization of re-
sources and of modifications in other surplus activities. The less
fortunate nations, however, live a borderline existence between
starvation and development. It cannot be expected that a
nation which needs to put every effort into its own existence and
the feeding of its people will be sensitive to the long-run effects
of atmospheric pollution and fouled streams. The dichotomy of
views at the Stockholm conference reflects these fundamental dif-
ferences. Clearly, the only way in which global environmental
protection can be realized, short of forceful imposition of the ma-
jor powers' environmental policies, is through the provision of
technical, social and financial assistance to these developing
countries. Given limited world resources, this means we must
accept some alteration in our patterns of consumption.
We cannot wage anti-technology guerilla warfare in a fu-
tile attempt to effect a return to a pre-technological "golden age"
which exists only in the minds of historical romantics. How-
ever, the senseless development of technology has created a cri-
sis leading to predictions of imminent systemic collapse. The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences projected that given our past failures
in decision-making, "[i]f society persists in its present course,
the future holds great peril, whether from the uncontrolled ef-
fects of technology itself or from an unreasoned political reac-
tion against all technological innovation."'" The growth in tech-
nical knowledge and productive capacity compressed within the
past decades overwhelms comparison with the material develop-
ment of any period in history. Perhaps the closest historical
parallel is the rise of the merchant economy in Medieval Europe,
which created a form of shifting wealth and expanding com-
merce at once symptom and cause of a massive restructuring of
post-feudal societies. Today, sweeping technological develop-
ment has created an expanding, affluent middle-class. This ex-
pansion of wealth and material benefit, achieved only through
technological growth, offers a social laboratory in which poverty,
even in its relative sense, can be relieved. With world popula-
tion at present levels we will continue to need the benefits of tech-
nological development and will be unable to prevent some ecolog-
ical harm. The solution is not to attack technology but to sen-
13. Id. at 118.
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sibly control the nature and pace of its development. Technolo-
gies are needed, not to proselytize competing ideologies, or to
create graven political images of the world's superpowers, but
to feed and clothe billions, to free them from the specters of di-
sease and starvation. They can be used to enrich human exis-
tence rather than destroy the essential quality of that existence.
Personal and Social Values
At the basis of any effective solution of environmental prob-
lems must be a shift in fundamental personal values. Some
have detected such fundamental shifts.' 4 There are, however,
three questions which must be answered before we can accept this
change as an operative reality: (1) what values are changing;
(2) why are they changing; and (3) what effect will these
changes have on the process of decision-making?
We may each agree in principle on the issue of environmen-
tal reform. However, beyond general consensus lie the incredibly
powerful distortions of personal belief, shaped by political, eco-
nomic, and religious thought.' 5 We should not be surprised at
what may seem to be a "seemingly irrational resistance to change"
often hindering the implementation and development of the
most well thought-out plans for reform. Individuals overwhelmed
by the current pace of life sometimes violently reject further var-
iations on the theme to which they may have only tenuously ad-justed. Therefore, any attempt to create or accelerate a funda-
mental reordering of beliefs and priorities may challenge the
ability of this society sufficiently to adjust. The beliefs and values
which must change are fundamental, encompassing economics
and business, education, and the realities of the political system.
However, any system which attempts to deal with these values
must recognize that each situation dependent upon such values
is not one of pure reason or logic, and the needed solutions may
not be purely rational. These values are more often felt than
conceived-symbolic reactions to basic propagandized concepts
committed to the maintenance of the historical system. Re-
gardless of the generalized consensus, therefore, effective change
may be transfixed at the point where we move from the identifica-
tion of broad objectives to the selection of steps toward solution.
14. See, e.g., SCEP REPORT, supra note 8 at 226; and Decision-Making,
supra note 10 at 192.
15. The rough consensus among decision-makers ends with a bang when
we pass from identifying objectives and formulating issues to choosing
and applying the criteria for deciding the issues. . . . It is in the ef-fort to sort out and apply the criteria with appropriate priorities to
concrete undertakings that the implications of the criteria fully emerge,
Decision-Making, supra note 10 at 191.
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To avoid this result, the various participants in the process
must see themselves as having a community of shared self-inter-
est with groups and cultures from which they have been geo-
graphically or culturally segregated. The urban poor have been
forced to suffer the most disruptive effects of a deteriorating en-
vironment for years. The more affluent middle-class suburban
dwellers are only now beginning to realize the substance of the
environmental problem. There has been no perceived identity of
interests on either an environmental or social plane between these
widely separated class groups. A shift in values, and a percep-
tion of common interests, will occur when Americans recog-
nize that they cannot escape the disastrous effects of misguided
decision-making; that at some point they themselves must begin
to pay for the total costs of the benefits being obtained. It is
almost as if Friendly Finance Company has finally decided to
collect on an old loan and the question is now what we have to
give up in order to pay the debt. The inner cities and the poor
have been used irresponsibly, living with the harsh realities of
extreme congestion, unsanitary conditions, air and water pollu-
tion for decades. They have served as a dumping ground for
the rest of society, reflecting the patterns of racism and class
orientation so prevalent in this nation. In a social analogue, there
was no "drug problem" until it began to infect the ranks of mid-
dle-class whites. The reality is that the prisoners of the ghettos
in our major cities have suffered the ravages of heroin use for
years, but, until now, were left to fend for themselves as long as
the problem affected only "poor" people.
Thus, the key factor in any shift in values is not social con-
cern, or any real desire to preserve the environment. It is rather
an individually selfish and therefore effective decision to protect
my environment. In this way will reform be achieved.
This interaction of perceived self-interest is the single most
effective method of forcing reform in political and economic
policies. The affluent middle-class that has now developed col-
lectively represents an extremely powerful mechanism for social
and environmental change. This group heretofore has not had
any significant impact upon policy making. Decisions have been
made by a more concentrated group of political and economic
interests. However, the middle-class has created the potential
for an alteration in traditional power relationships. We may
be experiencing a movement which, without violent revolution,
will eventually alter the lines of power and decision in this so-
ciety.
Social change must be effected by this movement, and it
must be done attitudinally. However, to conceive and direct
1973]
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our efforts solely along the tangents of environmental difficul-
ties is to deceive ourselves regarding the essential nature of the
problem. Reality may be defined in terms of fouled air and wa-
ter, insecticides, congestion and noise. These problems hold
grave significance but are themselves only symptomatic of a
more severe societal failure in the making of substantive decisions.
The poor cannot be expected to be much concerned with the envi-
ronment. As is true for underdeveloped nations,1" the need to
respond to immediate demands of day to day existence sets priori-
ties for survival rather than aesthetics and ecology.
TOWARD A NEW KIND OF DECISIONMAKING
Education
It should be clear that the way we make decisions governs
social attempts at problem-solving. What is needed, therefore,
is basic reform in decision-making. We should first recognize
that without change in the method we use to educate our chil-
dren any stop-gap efforts to alleviate environmental and social
problems will fail, whether through the narrowness of key de-
cision-makers, or through continued superficiality of public thought,
producing inability to conceive or sustain any meaningful reform.
The educational system must be redesigned to serve the end
for which it was intended-that of creating thinking individuals
with the ability to learn from experience and develop creative
responses. With the dream of such free public education as
our ideal, we must face the reality of its failure. Each year the
system processes millions of bodies with mass-produced minds
capable only of dealing with problems on superficial levels, dis-
torted by the pressures of prejudice and fear.
Any society is concerned with transmitting the values and cul-
ture which give it uniqueness, and our schools have provided
an effective mechanism for inculcating the significant values of
this society. However, when this process of socialization af-
fects our ability to respond to newly developing threats which
are.partly outside the historical context of those values and partly
created by them, it is time to reflect upon needed change. There
is danger in dwelling too long on past greatness. At some
point a system tied too closely to the past can lose the vitality
necessary to create and sustain effective change.
Political and Social Institutions
Our political units-national, state, and local-although
16. See ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 33.
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concerned in theory with the environmental failure predicted for
future decades, are heavily committed to the immediate func-
tioning of the economic system. Governmental and industrial de-
cision-makers whose concepts evolve from Depression economics
are unable to free themselves from the premises of that time.
A decision process must be created into which is placed a di-
versity of viewpoints. Without attempting to provide the back-
drop of melodrama flowing from environmental literature, it is
apparent that we are at a point in time where critical decisions
must be made. Significant changes will be necessary to affect
the traditional fabric of our society, including all of the major
political and cultural institutions in the shadow of which this na-
tion has developed. Life styles, pace, and culture must be
adapted to more intelligent uses of our resources and technologies.
No prophet can inform us of the precise amount of time
within which technologically-related decisions must be made.
Apocalyptic predictions of doom may well be accurate but will
not be heeded. Regardless of the nature of any proposals for
change, if the timing is such that the problems can be solved by
what seems to be agonizingly slow movement toward reform, then
difficulties will be handled and disaster will be avoided. Con-
versely, if, as some predict, we are confronted by a deadline
requiring hard and quick decisions, we may be too locked
into our current institutions for a timely response to be made.
The basic difficulty in environmental reform is that few involved,
and none in key positions of power, actually believe that we can
destroy the environment of this planet by any amount of exhaust
fumes, dirty water or seemingly unconnected individual acts.
Nonetheless, we must now make a choice as to the direc-
tion of our future action. The Academy of Sciences presents
that choice as one
not between the abandonment of technology as a tool of hu-
man aspiration and the uncontrolled pursuit of technology as
though more tools invariably meant a better life. The choice
. . . is between technological advance that proceeds with-
out adequate consideration of its consequences and tech-
nological change that is influenced by a deeper concern for
the interaction between man's tools and the human environ-
ment in which they do their work.
17
If this accurately states our options for choice, then, at
some point, we must move to the selection of means. Regard-
less of the potential of a middle-American neo-populist envi-
ronmental movement toward reform, the present reality is that
17. Id. at 2-3.
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now, and historically, political and industrial decision-making
affecting every level of this society, has been dominated by
very narrow interest groups. One of the most interesting aspects
of this domination has been the ability to convince the general
public that the decisions were either harmless or in the best inter-
ests of the persons affected. The decisions have been made by
groups of individuals in control of concentrated economic, po-
litical and militaristic power. The dynamics of this process have
existed regardless of the formal outlines of governmental struc-
tures. The question of decision-making, whether in the context
of the environment or other equally complex areas of concern, is
not tied specifically to any particular political system, although
the chances of implementing reform may be. The differences
between the world's political systems are less real than apparent
whether that system is democracy, socialism, communism or the
blend of which reality is constructed. The power brokers of each
system dictate the framework within which freedom of choice is
permitted, and have managed to define the degree of allowable
participation. It is this basic pattern which must be altered if
effective resolution of our difficulties is to be achieved. If we ac-
cept the principle of an informal shadow government operating
independently of any change in executive personality, as more aform of mindthink than conscious conspiracy, it is apparent that
change in the identity of individual participants is virtually mean-
ingless.
Whether conscious or patterned behavior, the political
system in the United States offers the most viable opportunity for
reform. The myth of democracy may be just that. Yet this
system, regardless of the reality of power, services that ideal. An
assertion of faith and a majoritarian effort to implement reform
holds promise for an orderly and effective surrender of the
lines of power and control. In that sense, the reforms de-
manded may be able to occur within the theoretical structure of
this government.
In creating the means for change, the simplest analysis
might lead one to conclude that the solution merely involves the
opening up of the decisional process to a full range of view-
points. Developing viewpoints is certainly necessary; however, we
must also begin to produce information and data enabling us to
predict the consequences of decisions. In any event, the primary
demand is for a method of informed decision-making.
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Paper reforms within the structure of government will have
little impact unless a substantial shift in values among the mem-
[Vol. .13
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bers of the relatively affluent American middle-class takes place.
Assuming the beginning of such a reordering of values and pri-
orities, we are still not presently equipped with the specific means
to utilize the pressure this would generate for informed deci-
sion-making. Even well-intentioned decisions currently fail be-
cause of diffused, uncertain and erratic structures.'" Effec-
tive, informed decision-making on any significant issue is an ac-
cident:
[N]o mechanism exists (sic) to trigger [needed] studies in
a systematic way at early stages in the process of develop-
ment and diffusion; to explore means of deciding whether a
given set of events does indeed represent an "early stage" in
a significant technological trend; to examine the terms of
reference or the methodologies of such studies as are being
undertaken; or to inject the results of such studies systematic-
ally into the decision-making process itself.19
Prior to the proposal of any concrete means of improving
our ability to perform valid assessments of existing and potential
technologies, four basic questions must be answered: 1) who
performs the assessments; 2) for what purposes; 3) through
what means, mechanisms and procedures; and 4) with what re-
suits? 20 These answers will determine the formal outlines of
the process to be proposed.
Data Gathering
At a minimum, the immense deficiency in data regarding
the social costs of any proposal must be remedied. Independent of
any other considerations, the data base from which we are pres-
ently making decisions must be improved. Some information is
available through a multitude of diverse studies of specific tech-
nological developments. However, there is no way to gauge the
significance of each study, or to achieve a full consideration of
inconsistent viewpoints. The studies will often be incomplete,
with unknown or inadequate methodologies. Equally significant,
they are often performed in the service of specific interest groups
with definite biases. This may affect both the validity and use-
fulness of findings unless particular biases can be identified and
isolated. An allied difficulty is the expense of comprehensive
studies. Many research efforts are performed by businesses and
industrial groups serving specific interests. Private groups at-
tempting to put forth either their own self-interest, or a particular
18. Katz, supra note 1 at 592.
19. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 27-28.
20. See Wollan, Controlling the Potential Hazards of Government Sponsored
Technology, 36 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 1105-06 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Wollan].
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conception of public interest, cannot afford massive expendi-
tures for countervailing research efforts. These groups are de-
pendent upon contributions of either money or services. There
is no comparison with -the resources available to business or gov-
ernment to provide technical justification for what they have
decided to do.
At present, and regardless of any alleged reforms within the
executive branch, there is no valid source to which either Con-
gress or other legislative or executive functionaries can consist-
ently turn for information that is complete and reliable. This is
a "critical obstacle to improved assessment,"'" and,
[w]ithout such an integrative mechanism for comprehensive
information management, the basic flaws in existing systems
-such as narrowness and inconsistency of criteria; lack of
detachment, professionalism and continuity; inadequate rep-
resentation of diffuse or subtly affected interests-are vir-
tually certain to persist. 22
Implementation and Enforcement: Governmental or Private?
Devising an organizational framework for the performance
of assessments may be the simplest element in the overall proc-
ess of reforming political decision-making. Greater difficulty
may lie in the implementation of that reform, both in government
and the private economic sectors. No enforcement is effective
without willing and committed enforcers and, as our criminaljustice system has so ably demonstrated, our government does in
fact control only with the cooperation of those governed. To
reform business decision-making and move toward a full consid-
eration of both internal and social costs will require a rework-
ing of our system of laws to preserve the competitive relationships
of business enterprises. This revision must occur legislatively
and is critical for the success of any reform effort.
If we concentrate on revising the internal governmental
structure to develop the ability to perform and use assessments,
we must first understand the existing limitations on the utiliza-
tion of government for such purposes. Proposals demonstrating
these limitations have been developed. They begin with the rec-
ognition that even a basic assessment involves "the careful evalua-
tion of complex and elusive relationships including those which
are constantly evolving between government, science, technology,
society and individuals. '2  The pressures involved in attempting
21. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 69-70.
22. Id.
23. Id. at v.
[Vol., 13
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
any assessment are extreme. Central to the proposals is the as-
sumption that if the persons charged with a decision are pro-
vided with information and technical data, they will be able to
make the "best" choice, although our history of government
clearly indicates the inability of officials to free themselves from
bias and interest group relationships on far too many issues.
Nonetheless, the reforms generally presented have been of
a centralized assessment mechanism placed within the federal
structure, or, alternatively, placement of the responsibility in
private hands, with substantial commitment of federal funds. The
present process represents a combination of the worst of these
approaches.
Michael Wollan, in his consideration of the current difficul-
ties of technology assessments, 24 reflects upon what he consid-
ers to be significant limitations on the capacity of the federal
government to objectively perform assessments. Wollan recom-
mends that primary responsibility for assessment be assigned to
private groups, operating outside the framework of government
and providing a complementary, more objective alternative to the
assessments which would still be performed by the federal gov-
ernment.25  These conclusions are based upon case studies Wol-
Ian performed on governmentally sponsored proposals. The
technologies were weather and climate modification, the proposed
supersonic transport (SST), and fluoridation of drinking wa-
ter.
Extensive analysis of data related to these proposals led to
the conclusion that the federal government has been distinctly un-
able to disregard its own vested interests and that those "inter-
ests in the continuation of its technological programs limit its
ability to provide adequate technology assessment."26  The stud-
ies also revealed that:
[T]he federal government is often aware of many of the im-
"plications of its programs in science and technology, but that
it should not be relied upon for thorough evaluation and reg-
ulation of the technologies it sponsors. What is needed...
is a way to counteract the natural tendency of the govern-
ment to resist rigorous and comprehensive technology assess-
ment .... 27
The effect of this deficiency in the present context is appar-
ent when we realize that the federal government, through one
24. Wollan, supra note 20 at 1134-35.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1134.
27. Id. at 1135.
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agency or another, is involved directly or indirectly in almost
one-half of this country's technological research and develop-
ment.28  A history of unenlightened governmental self-interest
may therefore preclude the full placement of any formalized
assessment mechanism within the federal government. A partial
solution may be private and quasi-public groups, with reputable,
competent staff, adequate funding, and with communication
channels to governmental decision-makers.
The question of an appropriate assessment mechanism was
considered by The National Academy of Sciences. Unlike Wol-
Ian, the Academy concluded the assessments should be per-
formed by an agency located within the overall structure of the
federal government. Although rejecting a highly centralized
mechanism, the Academy reported:
[W]hat we saw as needed was an agency, appropriately
placed in the federal structure, that could provide lead-
ership in developing a more coherent, consistent, and compre-
hensive approach to technology assessment throughout gov-
ernment and ultimately in the private sector as well, and that
could draw public and scholarly attention to the relevant is-
sues and problems. 29
The function of this agency was viewed as that of providing
"a supplementary set of mechanisms designed to inject into the
activities falling within its purview a new and broadened set of
perspectives."80  Regarding needed changes in private sector
technological decision-making, it was stated, "[t]he needed cli-
mate requires that private industry be encouraged to find its
own technical solution-not compelled to follow solutions for-
mulated from above."'"
Setting aside for a moment any debate over these contrast-
ing studies, it is clear that the federal government stands unri-
valled as both a harmful and beneficial decision-maker. The
ability to set executive policy, to enact laws altering the basic
competitive relationships between businesses, the enforcement
and regulatory power, and the impact of government spending
policies all combine to require the involvement of the federal
government in the development of an effective and coherent envi-
ronmental policy. However, care must be taken not to develop
another federal bureaucracy while developing a means to imple-
ment effective assessment procedures. The challenge we must
face is that of developing some degree of objectivity and insula-
28. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 22.
29. Id. at viii.
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 79.
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tion from inordinate political pressures within a system keyed to
subjective evaluation and response to political pressures.
The history of bureaucratic agencies has not been deserving
of praise. 2 If one were to set out today to create a method of
limiting perspective, producing rigidity, assuring co-optation of
goals, and guaranteeing lack of imagination, the answer would
be the establishment of a bureaucratic agency within the federal
government. In conceiving a way to counteract the harmful ef-
fects of technological decision-making, we must overcome these
limitations and grow from our experience. The response to any
major issue or need has for decades been to create a federal
means of dealing with the problem and, too commonly, to for-
mulate an agency to regulate or study. The characteristics of bu-
reaucratic structures at any level of government are those of im-
mobility, need for conformity, and permanence, while the present
problem requires forward looking, anticipatory solutions.33 We
have seemingly made the assumption that reform is inherently
defined as expansion of the federal bureaucracy, and that height-
ened levels of expenditures, a little revenue sharing, and perhaps
a report to Congress or the Executive (of course with recommenda-
tions) will solve everything.
Governmental agencies have proved inadequate, even in
their more traditional functions. To place the responsibility of
environmental policy and assessments in an environmental "su-
per agency" patterned in the usual manner is to inevitably limit
the assessments through ". . the delays, the bias and the rigidity
that invariably accompany the creation of a governmental bu-
reaucracy devoted to the furtherance of policing of a given
technology." 4  There is a predictable process of stagnation
whereby agencies created to protect a clearly defined public in-
terest generate, from within, forces working a subtle alteration
in function and values. These move the agency's direction from
its original justification to that of perpetuation of the agency it-
self, as if it were possessed of an independent and natural basis
for existing.8 5 Similarly tied to this process is the tendency of
the agency personnel and the interests allegedly regulated to de-
velop parallel interests and philosophies.86
32. See A. TOFFLER, Fu'ru SHOCK, 128-29 (1970).
33. See id. at 134-35.
34. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 38. However, the Academy
was of the opinion that a substantial part of this problem could be avoided by
carefully insulating any mechanism from direct involvement in policy-making
and that, "[a]bove all, it must be given no authority to screen or 'clear, new
technological undertakings." Id. at 81.
35. Id. at 59.
36. Id. at 61. This latter point is represented in recent action of the Sen-
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The outcome of any decision or study, technological or oth-
erwise, is largely dependent upon the goals and beliefs of the
persons performing the study or making the decisions. Uncon-
scious or conscious forces can distort any findings and affect the
validity of any position. This bias and interest group orientation
creates a serious obstacle to the development of means for fully
rational decisions. The patterns of illicit relationships between
the persons regulating and the subjects of such regulation create
questions regarding the ability of any level of the government to
achieve the independence necessary to the performance of its es-
sential functions, regardless of the rhetoric of well-meaning in-
tent.
Such independence is essential. Without a mechanism with
which to avoid bias and distortions through political pressures and
self-interest, dangers exist in the mere creation of a formal entity
tied too closely to the centers of government. The patterns of so-
cial and environmental decline have arisen in a decision-making
context characterized by interest group concentration, although
the influence has been more diffuse, individualized, and hap-
hazard than conspiratorial. The need for absolute independence
and the lack of such independence within current frameworks
must be accepted. The severe environmental difficulties pres-
ently being experienced are a function of prior policies. To re-
spond to present and future problems by creating one more pow-
erful force in government subjected to these same deficiencies ul-
timately may aggravate the situation rather than improve it. An
overall assessment and policy mechanism, "unless continually
subjected to independent criticism and countervailing pressures,
may become a weapon for individuals and groups in defense of
their own narrow interests. '37
The patterns of accelerated change now require more than
the same old responses. Bureaucracy may have to give way to
the newer, even more instantly responsive forms of organiza-
tion which must characterize the future."8
ate Commerce Committee. In a 15 to I vote, the Committee approved a bill to
replace the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), long a subject of criticism,
with an independent agency designed to regulate safety and quality in food, drugs,
and cosmetic products. Warren Magnuson, one of the chief sponsors of thebill, stated it would create a "responsive agency unfettered by cumbersome pro-
cedures or a structure which invites political pressure." The proposed act would
also provide that citizens could sue the agency for failure to carry out its regu-
latory duties. Another important step would be limitation of the administra-
tor to a single five year term. See CNI WEEKLY REPORT, VOL. II, No. 2, April 6,
1972, at 2.
37. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 87.
38. See TOFFLER, supra note 32 at 119-27.
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What these newer, more responsive forms will be is another
question. Yet defining the needs in the area of the environ-
ment may help to clarify our future paths.
The Problems of Politics
First, the political structure itself, outside of any issues of
bureaucratic ineptitude, may be unable to respond in any to-
tally effective way to environmental difficulties, or to any other
area requiring a comprehensive long-range approach. The theory
of government in this nation offers a degree of protection against
infringement of values considered fundamental to an idealistic
view of human individuality. Regardless of the hidden reali-
ties of power and decision in this or any other nation, the ideal
remains. A governmental structure shaped to this theory may be
too limited to respond effectively to contemporary problems ab-
sent a radical redefinition of the ideal:
[O]ur political system simply cannot address itself intelli-
gently and vigorously to problems that are essentially specu-
lative and remote in time. Given a political process that re-
sponds only to relatively proximate and demonstrable diffi-
culties, any effort to design a truly anticipatory assessment
structure would almost surely fail to provide a realistic link
between such a structure and the making of policy.39
This systemic difficulty is created for many reasons. First,!
votes are not gained by spending a great deal of time on activities
that no one recognizes as significant. Second, there is no current
way of identifying long-range problems in any systematic or, un-
fortunately, believable manner. Our political representatives are
not selected for either their intelligence or expertise. Our rep-
resentatives can, of course, provide the essential function of pre-
venting those forms of technological abuse which come to public
attention and about which some political reaction is demanded.
The Supersonic Transport and the ABM fall within this category.
However, this element of public visibility creates unusual forces
in the deliberative process and makes of it more of a staged per-
formance for public benefit than any accurate portrayal of the in-
ner workings of government decision-makers. Many issues that
should demand public attention receive little publicity,. The proc-
ess of relating questions of technology to political decisions is
at best random.40  Many issues are missed in this process that
39. ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE, supra note 9 at 48.
40. COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUtncs, H.R., 92D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS (Comm. Print 1969, Revised 1971) at
762.
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later prove to be crucial. One function of reformed decision-
making is the identification of these important but invisible
issues, forcing the decision process into play.
Citizen attitudes and public pressure are essential to a change
in the overall processes of decision and in those making deci-
sions. Yet constant "doomsdaying," even if accurate in each sit-
uation, will eventually be manifested in public disinterest and
apathy. Unless the situation clearly impacts on an immediate
and personal condition, there is a low threshold of tolerance for
volatile public issues. As long as the issue is specific, then pub-
lic reaction will be effective.
Apart from questions of form and method, in order for the
goals of full assessment of benefits and dangers to be achieved,
the results must be articulated into the decisional process. Prob-
lems of modes of communication and setting of priorities arise.
Significant issues of technical and social import typically do not
lend themselves to decisions based solely upon discrete data. The
information developed must be technically interpreted, and at
this point lies the greatest danger of bias and distortion. A re-
cent study concluded that technically oriented groups often en-
counter "extreme difficulty . . . in separating out the technical
issue and defining it in manageable terms."'" The inherent dif-
ficulties in communication are intensified as politically-oriented
groups attempt to interpret and apply the technical informa-
tion.42
Bias cannot be eliminated from any major decision.4" We
accept political bias as a necessary element of our way of govern-
ment. However, regardless of popular assumptions about sci-
entific objectivity, there is no evidence that scientists, in consider-
ing issues with substantial political content, are better able than
non-scientists to avoid the subjective effects of their own feel-
ings on particular issues. When any analysis is performed in the
course of an emotionally charged political controversy, it is very
difficult to render objective opinions. In an extensive congressional
report, it was concluded that "[e]ven technical experts find
themselves committed to the underlying (often unspoken) is-
41. Id. at 532.
42. id.
43. Id. at 763.
mhe effort of a technology assessment institution-or an individual
attempting an assessment of a technological issue--cannot exclude all
bias. Bias lurks in the basic assumptions, explicit or implicit, in
every study. It is found in the omissions and neglected challenges.Selection of factual evidence to present, since no study can accept all
evidence, is subject to bias. Sometimes even the order in which the
elements of the analysis are presented reveal bias. ...
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sue, on one side or the other, and shape their positions and stress
the evidence in support of it."' 4" As some bias appears inevitable,
we must seek to identify the nature and sources of that bias in or-
der to determine the validity of the information acted upon.
From Problems to Solutions
We must at some point move from a discussion of problems
and causes to solutions. We are a society geared to sameness in
an age demanding sensitivity to change. Beyond ideals of jus-
tice, equality, or distribution of resources, our basic institutions
stand squarely in the path of survival. Politics, education, and
economics are all linked in a manner producing results often con-
trary to our stated purposes. The ability to participate in the
workings of these institutions is limited to those possessing a nar-
row range of interests. It is in the shadow of these limitations
that we must begin the movement for change essential for the
long-range survival of this nation.
The solutions must be directed to the current decision-making
patterns of business and industry; to governmental responsive-
ness and decision-making; to the values, primarily economic, cur-
rently held in this nation; and to essential reforms in the ed-
ucational process. In moving from these broad dynamics of
change to specific proposals, we must face the reality that part
of the solution does not lie within the existing framework of gov-
ernment. The problems of the environment and our failures
in decision-making are multi-dimensional, as must be their solu-
tions. Reform will occur only when we have achieved a deci-
sional process in business, government, and in our personal hab-
its of resource consumption, dedicated to intelligent considera-
tion of the environmental and social effects of those decisions,
balanced against competing needs of a viable society.
For this end to be attained, two things must occur. First, a
national policy (or policies) must be established, identifying
short, intermediate, and long term problems and areas of need,
and seeking means for their resolution. Second, in the process
of identifying problems, projecting needs, and establishing pri-
orities, an informational base must be developed which provides
the range of data necessary to bring our decision-makers to the
point where "progress" can be defined in terms of enriching the
quality of human existence.
It is in these areas of setting policy and reliable data that
our political system, in its present form, is most inadequate.
44. Id. at 762.
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Current industrial decisions can be affected by changes in judi-
cial theory, or revisions in antitrust, corporate and tax laws. Pen-
alties can be legislated and, with relatively minor changes, enforced
against those violating environmental policy. However, the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches are, by their nature, essentially
short-run problem solvers, responding far more appropriately to
immediate issues than those requiring longer term analysis and
action. Some reform must occur within agency methods of en-
forcement, and such enforcement may represent the best means
of actual implementation of environmental policy. The limita-
tions of the existing system are both a source of strength and
weakness in the development of responses to current difficulties
of the environment. Political pressures created by the process of
election and by diffuse interest groups sustain our political sys-
tem, whether legislative or executive. These factors are inherent
characteristics of this elective federal government.
The three-pronged form of self-government created at the
beginning of this nation is a unique institution with built-in safe-
guards, each part complementing the other. This form, and
the manner of defining its purposes and functions, was more than
sufficient for the types of problems typical of that period. The
proliferation of technologies, including nuclear and biochemi-
cal weapons, has created the very real possibility of global destruc-
tion-a concept denied our colonial forebearers in all but biblical
contexts. It should not be surprising that the means for reacting
appropriately to such concerns was not directly provided by the
original framework. Yet the framers of the Constitution some-
how managed to create both a precedent and a means for adap-
tation of this government to meet its potentially most severe chal-
lenge.
EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE, JUDICIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
Conditioned as we are to the sanctity of these three branches
of government, nevertheless I propose that, in addition to the
reforms previously mentioned, an amendment to the United
States Constitution be developed and acted upon creating a fourth
branch of government, responsible primarily for the evolution
and implementation of environmental policy. A secondary role
of this newly created part of government would be the develop-
ment of information and data upon which more appropriate
decisions can be based. This information would be available to
the other three branches for assistance in their own processes, as
well as to private interests. The outlines of reform are rarely
simple and the addition of a fourth branch of government is
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not easy to propose. However, the previously discussed limita-
tions on our political process, and the need of an environmental
reform mechanism for long-range policy development, objec-
tivity, and freedom from political pressures, indicate that such a
solution at least deserves consideration. Congress is a massive
institution which may be incapable of the type of reform needed.
The executive has developed into a distinct institution. However,
responding to apparent needs for purposeful and prompt action
in a world of complex and evolving situations, it is restricted by its
basic qualities. Both Congress and the executive branches are
needed to fulfill essential functions, the dynamics of which are
inconsistent with those of development of long-term environ-
mental policy and decision.
The precedent for deliberate insulation from political pres-
sures is provided by the form of our highest judicial system.
It was recognized that the issues of constitutional magnitude
which would be under consideration held such import for this so-
ciety that absolute independence must be provided, and the fed-
eral courts were created to avoid the effects of politics and the
pressures of immediacy. The nature of the development of
long-term environmental and social policy and the relationships
affected by decisions dealing with these issues similarly require
such insulation.
Bureaucracies placed within the executive 'or legislative
branches can neither avoid their own inevitable narrowness
nor the shortened time perspectives characteristic of those parts
of government. For this reason, the information gathering and
development functions should be placed within this "environ-
mental branch."
The organizational format of the amended government could
be developed in a variety of ways. To justify being called into
existence, it must overcome the limiting features of the existing
process. Political and economic pressures must be alleviated in
order to provide the independence necessary to formulate needed
decisions. These pressures are commonly generated from re-elec-
tion needs, financial contributions for political campaigns, inter-
est group orientation, or a need for employment after leaving
office. These problems can be partially alleviated through limita-
tion of the length of service in the environmental branch to one
term, perhaps between 5 and 10 years; the providing of campaign
funds from public revenues with a prohibition against all other
contributions; and a provision roughly comparable to a "non-
competition" clause for a reasonable period of time following the
end of the term of office.
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Without attempting to offer a blueprint, such an entity might
additionally have some of the following features. It could be
composed of a fairly substantial governing board of one-term
elected individuals, elected on a non-partisan ballot, and selected
for nomination through a process other than political party cau-
cus. The terms could be staggered and represent diverse group-
ings of economic, environmental, social and political interests,
rather than geographical political units. The members might be
given substantial retirement benefits in an attempt to avoid the
temptation of doing favors for certain groups in exchange for
promises of financial security after leaving office.
Beneath these individuals responsible for policy development
could be a loose consortium of paid groups and individuals re-
sponsible for developing information and identifying the most
significant problem areas. To avoid the stagnation effect of
bureaucratic organization, there should be little centralized staff-
ing for other than data coordination purposes. The idea is to
create a climate of maximum independence. Conflict and di-
versity of viewpoint must be deliberately structured into these
functions. An immense reservoir of both creativity and inde-
pendence exists in the diversity of private voluntary groups.
These must be fused into the functioning of this part of govern-
ment. The perspectives of volunteers can often fill in gaps un-
touched through "professional blindness." This new branch
must draw from existing systems. It must be prepared to gen-
erate system-wide environmental reform through its policies. It
should have the power to initiate and propose legislative solu-
tions to the other branches of government and to veto congres-
sional or executive actions with substantial negative impact on es-
tablished environmental policies. It should also be able to resort
to the courts for declaratory or injunctive relief where necessary.
CONCLUSION
We are endangered through the irrational uses of technol-
ogy, and equally endangered from unreasoned decisions of social
policy. The problems of our cities and of the increasingly vocal
developing nations present warnings regarding the future de-
velopment of this civilization. The pressures of starvation and
disease, with the increasing anger of nations deprived of the
means to overcome social problems, force our attention toward
the immediate resolution of these wrongs.
As the next decades pass, we will increasingly confront the
consequences of these heightened demands. The suggestions for
understanding of the varied forces involved, and for reform of
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the decision-making policies apply to our society not only in the
highly significant dimension of environment but equally so in
areas of social reform. Usually proposals are made in the con-
text of presuming that mere tinkering with the mechanisms of
government will ineluctably result in the sweeping changes nec-
essary for solutions. The current political structure is not adapt-
ing sufficiently to provide the requisite elements of such solutions.
Nonetheless, any effective change must partake of the power in-
herent in governmental structures, without suffering the distor-
tions of current practices. It is this premise which underlies the
proposal for development of an additional level within the politi-
cal framework. The proposed constitutional amendment is the
only viable remedy.
